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Abstract: Contemporary discussions of art regularly contrast artistic judgement
and appreciation with the judgement and appreciation of beauty (and similar), as
aesthetic judgement and appreciation—if not always in those terms. That con-
trast seems fundamental to our understanding of art. For there will be features,
ascribable to artworks, that must be understood by contrast with such aesthetic
appreciation. Further, considerations from natural beauty and attractive design
(as with, say, wallpaper) seem ill-suited to explain what is distinctive about art, as
it is presently understood. Too often, though, the aesthetic here is left relatively
unconsidered—with perhaps recognition of its attention to manifest properties,
such as colours, sounds and textures, as grounding beauty (or whatever): that is,
those properties that do not depend on the recognition of art-status. A position
that fails to draw this artistic/aesthetic contrast cannot tolerate the category of
art as such (however much it thinks it can). In different contexts, concern with the
aesthetic may amount to different things, drawing on different contrasts.
Contemporary discussions of art regularly contrast artistic judgement and
appreciation with the judgement and appreciation of beauty (and similar),
as aesthetic judgement and appreciation—if not always in those terms. That
contrast seems fundamental to our understanding of art. For there will be
features, ascribable to artworks, that must be understood by contrast with
such aesthetic appreciation. As Arthur Danto points out, artworks reflect the
embodiment of meaning.1 Further, considerations from natural beauty and
attractive design (as with, say, wallpaper) seem ill-suited to explain what
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is distinctive about art, as it is presently understood. Too often, though,
the aesthetic here is left relatively unconsidered, beyond its connection to
the appreciation of beauty (and such like)—with perhaps recognition of its
attention to manifest properties, such as colours, sounds and textures, as
grounding beauty (or whatever): that is, those properties that do not depend
on the recognition of art-status.
Such properties are widely addressed as though more or less homogeneous.
At the least, Danto, in searching for “confusable counterparts” of artworks,
seems to be appealing to properties shared by artworks and non-art objects:
for many, these will be included amongst aesthetic properties.2 At the least,
the concept of the aesthetic seems fairly clear here, whatever its relation to the
artistic. So a first thought might be that, although the aesthetic might be a
difficult concept to elucidate, its elucidation would be—somehow—along one
dimension. But now I recognize that such an account will not do: that the
nature of aesthetic judgement typically requires more articulation of context
than is usually granted by aestheticians.
This issue has a direct relevance to other ideas of mine, in three related
ways. First, an artistic/aesthetic contrast like that sketched above is de-
ployed, as a technical distinction, in my account of a framework for philo-
sophical aesthetics. And my exposition of that framework had included a
promise to elaborate the concept of the aesthetic; and I had not discharged
that obligation. Second, the contextualism just mentioned for the aesthetic is
of a piece with my more general contextualism, thereby recognizing aesthetic
judgement as context-dependent or occasion sensitive.3 But, third, a specific
aspect of such contextualism, sketched by Austin, locates the particular con-
tribution of some terms in some contexts as operating broadly negatively:
and here I shall urge that aesthetic judgement falls into that category.4
I
So, in line with the first point, one way to identify the topic of this paper is by
elaborating a comparison and contrast with some of my previous discussions.
Thus, I advertised my Artistic Judgement as volume one of The Muscular
Aesthetic, explaining its project as concerned with the philosophy of art.5
That project included the stipulation in verbal terms of the contrast urged
above as central to concern with the philosophy of art: that is, a contrast
between the judgement and appreciation of artworks (called “artistic appre-
ciation”) and the judgement and appreciation of all the other cases of interest
in line, grace, and so on, as well as their opposites (together called “aesthetic
judgement”). For, to deploy the idea of fine art as we do, whatever words
are used, is implicitly to contrast such art, and our interest in it, with other
objects of (mere) aesthetic interest: the artwork must be distinguished from
the wallpaper on the wall on which it hangs—failure to draw this contrast is
a failure to grasp the distinctiveness of art. And, as above, this contrast was
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elaborated by reference to “confusable counterparts”.6 Hence a position that
fails to draw this artistic/aesthetic contrast cannot tolerate the category of
art as such (however much it thinks it can). In line with its target in the phi-
losophy of art, Artistic Judgement addressed my so-called artistic judgement
throughout, promising to take up the corresponding aesthetic judgement in
its sequel. But when the second half of The Muscular Aesthetic appeared (as
The Philosophical Aesthetics of Dance), it did not discharge this obligation,
in part because the variety of cases to be considered precluded the brief treat-
ment of this issue that I had envisaged initially.7 And the rationale for that
strategy will be demonstrated, or, anyway, exemplified, in this paper.
Thus, here, I will say something more in elaboration of the aesthetic, and
aesthetic judgement, while still falling short of completely discharging my
previous obligation. One complexity here becomes clear when we note the
injunction from Austin to attend to “the dainty and the dumpy”.8 For that
injunction rightly recognizes that aesthetic interest, properly understood, can
be in the ugly, and such like, as well as the beautiful and the graceful. This
idea has a familiar application to art: the paintings of Chaim Soutine or of
Goya’s ‘Black Period’ are certainly not beautiful in any ordinary sense: nev-
ertheless they are suitable ‘objects of artistic appreciation’. But one must also
reject the ‘aesthetic’ account of artistic beauty, which takes art’s “. . . primary
aim . . . [as] to produce beauty, by which I mean something with positive aes-
thetic value”: for most aestheticians, artworks such as the Warhol Brillo
Boxes demonstrate the falsity of this conception of art, since the interest of
such works seems unconnected to their appearance.9 At the least, they are not
beautiful, nor meant to be. Hence, at least applied to art, judgements of the
broadly aesthetic include works granted to be ugly, at least in the ordinary
sense. By contrast, though, the term “aesthetic” in common parlance seems
generally reserved for the cases of positive aesthetic value: that is, of beauty,
or something similar.10 In practice, then, aesthetic interest is rarely evinced
in respect of the ugly. We may criticize something as ugly, and explain the
basis of this criticism as aesthetic; yet, asked for aesthetic judgement, these
will not be typical examples. So the term “aesthetic” seems to amount to
something different in those cases where the answer will recognize positive
or negative valencies of the aesthetic from those where only the positive is
granted.
All this becomes problematic in philosophical aesthetics once we notice
that many objects of genuine artistic interest (artworks) might also be per-
ceived as of aesthetic interest: that is, often they are objects of beauty, or
something similar. Of course, as I argued in Artistic Judgement, this is mis-
perception, if the object really is an artwork: we are treating the music, say, as
though it were birdsong or the painting as though it were wallpaper; and that
is—in effect—to mistreat it by misperceiving it.11 To elaborate that claim, I
would follow Walton in identifying those categories of art within which art-
works must be located to avoid such misperception, to argue that more than
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a work’s manifest properties can bear on its proper appreciation: that, for
instance, facts about an artwork’s history of making can be of relevance.12
But, equally, those who do not understand the distinctiveness of artworks
can nevertheless often find something worthy of appreciation in the objects
that comprise these works: at least sometimes, the painting, for instance, is
rightly beautiful or graceful, even if such a mode of attention pays no regard
to its art-status; and hence misperceives it.
Moreover, this issue is tied to the idea of the aesthetic as perceptual: that
the manifest properties mentioned above are typically thought those given
immediately and directly in perception. And this too can seem a marker
for the aesthetic. Thus, there does not seem to be quite the same issue for
literature, an artform where the traditional mode of engagement, reading, is
not straightforwardly perceptual.13 And this is just to recognize the literary
case as importantly different in this respect from, say, much painting or music.
For, although works appropriate for art-type reading should be contrasted
with those appropriate for other types of reading (that is, roughly, a contrast
between, say, those novels that are literature and those that are not), the non-
literature works for reading are not regularly or reliably thought aesthetic.
Indeed, it seems odd to regard novels or poems both as not artworks, and
yet aesthetic. But such cases are not the centre of our concern with artworks
and the aesthetic.14
II
In line with the second idea identified above, my conceptual framework here
is heavily contextual. I deploy Charles Travis’s idea of occasion-sensitivity:
thus, if a claim that previously counted as true now counts as false, that need
not reflect simply a change in the world crudely conceived: rather, it follows
from the occasion-sensitivity of relevant concepts that the very same door
might count as blue on this occasion but not blue on some other occasion,
without its pigmentation changing in the meantime (say, all the doors in the
street were painted either red, green or blue—this was one of the blue ones,
whatever its current state of deterioration); or that curtains (drapes) might
be red for some purposes (despite being faded and in tatters), but not red on
other occasions. So that:
. . . there are various things that might be said in describing the drapes
as red; various things that might count, or again, not count, as their
being red. The mere notion of something’s being red does not, as such,
choose any of these as what one would say, or what would so count.15
What is said depends on the occasion of the speaking—there is no one
thing it amounts to, (somehow) based on the words alone, or their truth-
conditions. Of course, I do not defend this idea here. But this alone, once
granted, might lead to suspicion that any single unified account will accommo-
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date the aesthetic. Yet, by itself, it would not offer anything more particular
to add. Where next?
Some discussions of sport recently brought one aspect of this issue to my
attention. To understand what these discussions raise, one must first address
two distinctions: that between aesthetic sports and purposive sports; and that,
as an abstraction, between partisan spectators of sporting events and their
purist counterparts.16 David Best recognizes that typical sports are of one of
two kinds:17 in the first, aesthetic sports, the scoring depends on the manner
of performance, as in gymnastic vaulting or figure skating, so that one is not
just trying, say, to get over the vaulting horse but to do so in a particular
way; and this is what scores the points that lead, ultimately, to victory in the
sport. For the second kind, purposive sports, the manner of scoring does not
matter, as long as it is within the rules. In particular, for purposive sports,
the grace or elegance of scoring is beside the point, since it is not reflected in
the scoring in the sport. Most sports will be of this purposive kind. Thus,
in soccer (football), the goalmouth scramble counts as much, or as little, as
the elegant volley, as long as it is within the rules (as, say, Maradona’s ‘Hand
of God’ goal should not have been). All count as just one goal, even when
one is elegantly achieved and the other is not. Notice that this is a comment
concerning the nature of sport, related to the character of success in that
sport, and is not just a recipe for spectatorship in that sport. For, although
a spectator may admire the grace or elegance of the pass or the short, that
admiration is formally irrelevant.
Although neither of Best’s terms is entirely happy, the valuing in aesthetic
sports is broadly aesthetic, in that it is concerned with the grace, line and
elegance of the actions within the sport (although here again the positive
valence is typically implicit); while the valuing within purposive sports is
irreducibly purposive—that is why, when someone takes an aesthetic interest
in events in purposive sport, such as soccer, the purposive element is typically
set aside, or assumed to be successful: the elegant pass must succeed as a
pass; and graceful dribbling of the ball requires that the dribbling be aimed
towards some purpose in the game—otherwise it is just self-indulgent.18 Thus,
in the ‘Goal of the Month’ competition on UK television, a panel of experts
was asked to evaluate a series of goals from soccer matches. Since each will
be a goal, and since all these goals are detached from any place in match or
competition (we do not know, nor care, if they were, say, winning goals), the
panel can only address the grace and elegance with which this goal was scored:
here, the interest is more properly aesthetic; but only once the purposive
element integral to the sport is independently satisfied.19 Indeed, there is a
clear sense in which watching these goals differs from, for instance, watching
highlights of football matches: in that sense, watching them in the ‘Goal of
the Month’ competition is not really watching soccer at all.
The second key contrast, between the partisan and the purist, concerns
sports spectating. Thus, in contrast to the partisan, Mumford’s purist “. . . is
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a fan of a sport, and may love deeply the sport concerned, but have no
particular allegiance to any particular team. . . . [Such a person] may attend
games and enjoy them despite having no preference for either team to win”.20
As one indicator here, the purist will hope for the best game, with both teams
playing to their full potential, while the partisan “. . .may be very happy if
the opposition team underperforms”, since this will presumably facilitate his
preferred team’s winning.21 Hence:
. . . the purist . . .may enjoy working out the tactics of the two teams
and seeing how the play develops, how the tactics are adapted to fit
new circumstances, and how the game has key moments of drama.
. . . [Purists] may also enjoy seeing individual skilful players, perhaps
competing against each other, and will want both sides to play well, to
their full potential.22
In summary, Mumford claims that “[a]ny interest that the purist has is
for the sport itself. . . . [Purists] want to see it for all its beauty and drama
. . . they would much rather see a beautiful game irrespective of the winner.”23
This defence of purism admonishes us to adopt “. . . a life enjoying sport for
its purely positive and aesthetic aspects”.24
Such a contrast is given relevance for us here by Mumford’s insistence,
first, that “. . . one reason to watch sport . . . [is] because it gives aesthetic
pleasure” and, second, that the purist’s interest in sport is an aesthetic inter-
est; that the Mumford’s purist is seeing “. . . only aesthetic aspects of sport”,
or something of that sort.25 It seems, then, that the purist attends to aesthetic
aspects of purposive sports because the purposive dimension is set aside, as
though only these concepts should have application here. But such an infer-
ence is unjustified: an interest in what is not (or is no longer) purposive is
not necessarily thereby aesthetic. Similarly, one might acknowledge Bauhaus
furniture, for instance, as worthy of admiration as efficient without thereby
making an aesthetic judgement of that furniture. Moreover, if the purist sim-
ply insists on these concepts as exhausting his interest, the specific transition
from non-purposive to aesthetic remains unjustified.
Indeed, in a similar vein, disinterestedness is regularly raised in attempts
to characterize “the aesthetic”; as though a concern for an object itself that
lacked any interest in the functional or purposive qualities can only be a con-
cern with its intrinsic qualities. Yet disinterestedness can take many forms;
imply many differing contrasts. Certainly, when my interest in the events un-
folding is an aesthetic interest (and especially “merely an aesthetic interest”),
I will not be an interested party; or, at least, my concern will not reflect any
degree of interest beyond the minimal. But that can leave open the extent
to which I am concerned with the ugly aspects of aesthetic attention, and
therefore the degree to which that is, or is not, implicit in the use of the term
“aesthetic” in any specific context one selected.
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For example, when my concern with the sculpture is with its look, and not
with its use as a door-stop, we are some distance to recognizing my interest as
aesthetic interest. Moreover, since there can be a contrast with the purposive
(as for sport-types), it is right that aesthetic evaluation is typically non-
purposive (as in Best’s account of sports). That is, a contrast here with the
purposive is useful in shedding light on the aesthetic (in this context); my
concern was not purposive, so . . . The problems here are, first, that it seems
more needs to be said to locate the concern as aesthetic: in this case at least,
the contrast is not enough;26 and, second, that knowing the interest is not
purposive is only revealing of its being aesthetic in those contexts where that
is the natural contest to be drawing. For that is a way to ask what the term
“aesthetic” amounts to in that context or in that utterance.
With what does my aesthetic concern for a landscape ‘naturally’ be con-
trasted? If I am to remain disinterested (the fact that I own the land, and
could sell it for millions, is not germane), my interest might be thought aes-
thetic; and (perhaps) rightly so. But such a view would be consistent with
a purposive concern; for instance, one with the amount of oxygen this land’s
trees return to the atmosphere. Yet this is not always the contrast being
drawn by uses of the term “aesthetic” (not least because another, with “in-
terested”, was identified above); and the aesthetic is not alone in being non-
purposive. That was the moral from the design of furniture and other func-
tional objects: one cannot, in good part, admire them simply aesthetically,
since they must do the job for which they were designed—to some degree at
least! (Such chairs need not be very comfortable!) Here, we are engaged with
a kind of functional beauty, where our interest is certainly not in the look of
the thing only; but neither is it confined to its ability to fulfil its role. Here,
an aesthetic concern merges with a practical one. And a full account of the
aesthetic would need to give some consideration to such cases.
Once this point is recognized, the problem faced in Artistic Judgement
may become clearer: that one can recognize aesthetic appreciation, drawing
on its Greek roots, as essentially perceptual; and as concerned with grace, line
and so on. Of course, as with the earlier remarks about the artistic, these
comments on the aesthetic are not merely verbal, about how the term “aes-
thetic” is, or should be, used: the point throughout is to recognize the artis-
tic/aesthetic contrast, with its roots in the perceptual recognition of grace,
line, elegance, and similar. Other uses of the term “aesthetic”, lacking such
roots, can be set aside here.27 But little else can be said about it, not least
because the technical account of the aesthetic (which grants aesthetic status
to judgements of ugliness, as above) is rarely carried through into ordinary
claims. Yet, surely, if an object counts as of aesthetic interest by being ugly,
the scope of aesthetic interest is different than when the concern is only with
positive aesthetic values.
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III
That leads us to the third of the ideas of mine mentioned above. For if the
context differs when ugliness is being ruled out from that when it is not, that
will draw to our attention to what point the term “aesthetic” makes when
it is used here: that too requires attention to what is being thereby denied
or ruled out. The point I am after here is roughly of the kind Austin makes
in respect of, say, the term “free”, in noting that “. . . ‘free’ is only used to
rule out the suggestion of some or all of its recognized antitheses”, such that
the content of calling the action free is provided in part via the antithetical
notion.28 For we have seen that explaining the scope of “aesthetic” typically
contrasts it with another concept. Thus, we have acknowledged that, like
the term “free”, the term “aesthetic” is invoked when something specific is
being denied: one of “. . . its recognized antitheses”. And that it gets some of
its content from that denial: but, since there are many such contrasts, not
necessarily the same contribution on all occasions.
Moreover, the negative, or denial-based, character of the ascription here is
easily missed, since it can seem that, when contrasted with, say, the purposive,
the aesthetic is always taken to have a kind of positive value or valence. But
this is a confusion easily recognized in seeing that the requirement that a
person’s last-will-and-testament be “true full, and free” is not the positive
condition it sounds: rather, it is a kind of shorthand for all the conditions
that would defeat the legality, and so on, of the will. It is to this idea,
sometimes called defeasibility, that Austin was alluding in his discussion of
freedom.29 Thus, Austin urges that to say we acted freely:
. . . is to say only that we acted not un-freely, on one of the many
heterogeneous ways of so acting (under duress, or what not).30
And, of course, we know Austin was familiar with such legal distinctions,
not least through his connections with H. L. A. Hart, including the class
referred to in Austin 1979, (195 note).
Interest in beauty can make this point in a simplified form, by showing
its connection to those sub-categories within which one typically identifies
aesthetic concern. When Sibley discussed attributive and predicative uses
of terms, he recognized that “. . . ‘beautiful for a pig’ seems all right whereas
‘beautiful for a pebble’ seems odd”; and “beige for a dress” seems downright
peculiar.31 Hence, if the object is of a certain type, where appreciation of its
look (or some such) as a typical mode of appreciation, to recognize that one’s
interest is not, after all, in its purposive qualities may be suitably clarifying.
Further, one way of addressing what the term “aesthetic” amounts to in that
context or in that utterance is suggested: by considering, in Austin’s terms,
what exactly is the right antithesis for this occasion.
However, might one then be struck by the object’s ugliness? Seen one
way, that would be permissible within the more global ‘aesthetic concern’
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rubric (the one officially adopted by much philosophy); but not from within
that more traditional view that aligns the aesthetic only with its positive
valence. What is the difference here? Then Austin’s view seems exactly
right: a difference of contrast means that the aesthetic amounts to something
different in each case.
IV
My thought has been to suggest that a variety of contrasts are standardly
drawn for the term the aesthetic, identifiable primarily through what each
implicitly denies. But the same apparent contrast can conceal differences:
for example, whether or not, in that context, the aesthetic includes the ugly.
Hence, that we should be wary of inferring too much even from some of the
familiar contrasts.
For instance, Mumford’s hypothetical purist, sketched above, may ad-
mire the game itself, somehow detached from any purposive concern.32 Yet
that does not mean that his concern is automatically aesthetic (contrary to
Mumford’s assertions—at least, if the term “aesthetic” maintains its standard
contrasts). To admire efficiency, for example, even in those sport-directed
actions of which the sporting event is composed, is not—or not necessarily—
aesthetic admiration, since the efficiency will relate to the winning and losing,
and need not be graceful or elegant (unless one makes it so by fiat). There are
sporting styles that, while effective, contain flourishes and other movements
unnecessary for ‘getting the job done’ (here, Best cites the running of Emil
Zatopek, who “. . . was not an aesthetically attractive runner because much of
his movement seemed irrelevant to the ideal of most direct accomplishment
of the task”; but readers can supply their own examples).33 These styles [a]
seem inefficient, say, mechanically; and [b] lack grace or elegance. But obvi-
ously, there is a sense in which they need not be inefficient in practical terms
(that is, ineffective): Zatopek was a highly successful runner, despite “. . . the
extraneous rolls and jerks which seemed wasteful”.34 And, as above, to con-
clude, say, that Zatopek’s running must count as graceful in context because
it is efficient, would amount to tying the aesthetic to efficiency by fiat.
This case illustrates two related points: first, when drawing attention to
aesthetic interest, we are typically contrasting it with some other interest
(such as purposive interest), but there is not just one kind of judgement here
since typically, as in this case, many “recognized antitheses” are possible, and
the impact of the term “aesthetic” remains unclear until the contrast here is
recognized. After all, sometimes the recognition of efficiency has an aesthetic
dimension, and sometimes it does not. Second, the aesthetic appreciation
depends on what kind of thing is being appreciated, since these too can gen-
erate “. . . recognized antitheses”: the actions of persons (say, those involved in
sport) differ from the movements of those persons in having a normative nexus
provided by the context—we can imagine mistakes and misfires there, under-
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stood in terms of failures of goal-directedness, while (for movements) there
is only the movement: it cannot be a failure, as such. Consider, say, claims
to elegance for chess moves: at the least, such elegance cannot be explained
causally, since a bad move in chess has a causal explanation just as much as a
good move. So ugly moves cannot be distinguished on that basis from elegant
ones. As Frege recognized, “[e]rror and superstition have causes just as much
as correct cognition”, which grants that, say, a particular causal story for
some event—or amounting to particular bodily movements—cannot explain
that event’s normative force (cannot, say, distinguish the elegant chess move
from the other).35 Hence the aesthetic appreciation of human actions—say, in
sport (where passes in soccer must succeed to count as passes)—necessarily
differs from that of the (constitutive) movements, in just the ways Austin’s
view suggests.
V
Indeed, we can perhaps now return to the issue from the perspective of The
Muscular Aesthetic, with its first volume directed at the artistic part of the
artistic/aesthetic contrast—enough was said about the aesthetic to clarify
the target, and to show what the artistic was not—although the possibility of
confusing the artistic and the aesthetic, as well as the disastrous consequences
of doing so, were emphasized. For instance, much of the debate around the
propaganda-status of Riefenstahl’s film Triumph of the Will (1935) disap-
pears once it is recognized as an object of aesthetic appreciation only, not an
artwork: hence it does not pose the question of whether artworks can embody
propaganda.
My thought had been that, in order to say more about the artform dance,
the second volume would require a much fuller treatment of the aesthetic than
in the first volume, not least because the line, elegance, and grace of human
bodies in motion (a subject of aesthetic interest, as here) would need to be
clarified, and contrasted with the line, elegance, and grace of the dancers in
performing the artworks (artistic appreciation). But doing this in enough
detail to clarify the case for dance still left a great deal of the aesthetic unac-
counted for; or, at least, it seemed to. For that discussion had dealt with, at
most, one of the “recognized antitheses”. By contrast, my thought here is that
the aesthetic will always be the junior partner in such a relationship, such
that we can say enough about it to elaborate the positive, ‘senior partner’
(art, dance) without producing a list of features or properties that charac-
terized the aesthetic exceptionlessly, even granting the defeasibility of such
claims.36 And here this point is exemplified with the sport-based example.
Moreover, the consideration of sport illustrates why one cannot simply
proceed by addressing the “recognized antitheses” one-by-one. For we have no
method of drawing up the list of such “antitheses”: at best, we can recognize
them when we encounter them; and each will depend on which features of
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contrast are deployed, including whether or not the term “aesthetic” assumes
the positive valence.
So, by discussing the case from sport, we have in effect distinguished two
kinds of aesthetic concern for persons here: that depending simply on the
grace or elegance or whatever of the movements of the human body, de-
tached from the particular actions involved; and that where the actions of
the person (in the case imagined, the footballing actions) are admired. In
the second case, one cannot identify the actions admired detached from the
sporting event; and hence from the sport itself. Further, that sport—and
hence the actions comprising a sporting event—depend in part on its rules,
since they constrain actions appropriate within the sport. This is relevant
here in showing (once again) the diversity within the aesthetic: one cannot
bring to bear a single, unified conception of the aesthetic even as it applies
to human activities—we have seen that by contrasting two cases that might
be applied to sport, without addressing the further, crucially different case
of the artform of dance.37 So, while there is mileage in contrasting such aes-
thetic judgement and appreciation with the judgement and appreciation of
art (the artistic/aesthetic contrast, as deployed in AJ) and in distinguish-
ing aesthetic concerns from purposive ones, this does not give us a durable
positive characterization of the aesthetic, applicable exceptionlessly across all
contexts and situations. Then someone might insist that this is, after all, a
kind of systematic framework. My point has been that this is the maximum
systematicity that the concepts permit: and that it is not much. Rather, in
different contexts, concern with the aesthetic may amount to different things,
drawing on different contrasts, only some of which have been distinguished
here. But at least the contrastive character of some such uses offers us a
partial explanation: in this sense, we return refreshed to aesthetic judgement
as context-dependent or occasion-sensitive (see Travis 2008, es150-160). That
in turn grounds the general difficulty in dealing broadly with the category
of the aesthetic for any who accept the framework sketched here (and thus
my difficulty in dealing with it). Hence our conclusion must be to prefer a
contextualist diversity in accounts of that category, in line with the thoughts
here, once the hope for a single, unified account is set aside.
gmcfee@Exchange.fullerton.edu
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22. Mumford 2012b, 10.
23. Mumford 2012b, 14. Mumford (2012b, 10)
is arguing against Dixon, 2001 who pre-
sented the purist as “. . . someone whose al-
legiance shifts according to which is cur-
rently the best team” (Dixon is quoted
Mumford 2012b, 14 top).
24. Mumford 2012b, 18.
25. Mumford 2012b, 41, and resMumford
2012a, 372.
26. Although perhaps Kant thought it should
be. As Paul Guyer (2005 192) accu-
rately notes: “. . . Kant begins his analy-
sis of . . . our claim that a particular ob-
ject is beautiful from the premise that our
pleasure in a beautiful object occurs inde-
pendently of any interest in the existence
of the object as physiologically agreeable
(CPJ, §3, 5. 205-7) or as good for some
purpose expressed by a determinate con-
cept of utility or morality (CPJ, §4, 5.
207-9).” (“CPJ” refers, of course, to Kant
1789: Critique of the Power of Judge-
ment.) Here, “disinterestedness” seems
portrayed as sufficient.
27. As can any that take for granted the univo-
cality of “aesthetic”: sometimes this com-
mitment is explicit.
28. Austin 1979, 180. Austin (1962, 15, note)
offers, as some recognized antitheses for
“free’, (i) being in prison; (ii) being tied
up in prison; and (iii) committed to a prior
engagement—even before we come to the
varieties of being coerced or constrained in
one of many ways.
29. See Baker 1977.
30. Austin 1979, 180.
31. Lyas 2013, 197.
32. Or, at the least, this might be urged: as
previously, one can only admire the ele-
gance of the successful pass or of the drib-
bling that moves one’s side towards vic-
tory (or one’s opponents away from it);
otherwise it may just become just self-
indulgence.
33. Best 1978, 106.
34. Best 1978, 107.
35. Frege 1918, 351.
36. AJ, 33-34.
37. Consider the fate of the Archie Gemmill
goal (against the Netherlands) in the 1978
FIFA World Cup (McFee 2015, Ch. 6):
it was recorded using the movement nota-
tion system Labanotation, and that score
was ‘translated’ into a dance by Andy
Howitt—and performed on at least three
occasions, including once at Sadlers Wells
theatre. But how exactly does dance relate
to goal? If the constraint on successfully
performing that dance was, say, to follow
the Labanotation score, the status of Gem-
mill’s own dribbling run and goal would be
unclear: it would have the wrong ‘direction
of fit’, since the Labanotation score was
made from what Gemmill actually did. In
his case, any mismatch between notated
score and behaviour would be a criticism
of the score, not the movement. Yet then,
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at the least, the elegance of that sequence
of movements—as captured through the
dance, perhaps, and then transfigured into
art—has really nothing to do with football:
anymore than my choreographing a dance
based on the expressive movements of a
roadsweeper would mean that the dance
was the road sweeping; or even that it was
‘about’ roadsweeping. So Gemmill’s move-
ment pattern is elegant as a goal: and
that means as part of the match, with
the concomitant connection to the aspira-
tion to win. In abstracting from that, the
dance loses any connection to football (as
though, if it were performed tomorrow, a
new player might succeed in tackling the
Gemmill figure!). Watching the dance is
not really watching that goal.
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